‘Time is not all powerful’ : the Johannine eschatological vision in Eugene Vodolazkin’s Laurus by Bowlby, Ewan
‘ T I M E I S N O T A L L P O W E R F U L ’ :
T H E J O H A N N I N E
E S C H A T O L O G I C A L V I S I O N I N
E U G E N E V O D O L A Z K I N ’ S
L A U R U S
Ewan Bowlby *
* Abstract
Eugene Vodolazkin’s Laurus employs literary ‘distortion’ to capture and con-
vey the eschatological paradoxes of the Fourth Gospel. Having outlined the
complexity and contradictions of the Johannine eschatological vision, this
article describes how Laurus meets the challenge presented by this vision.
Rather than seeking to resolve the tension between vertical and horizontal
eschatological dimensions, Vodolazkin reshapes time itself to accommodate
both realised and future-oriented eschatologies. This remythologising of
time is a distortion that brings the reader closer to the rich imaginative depths
of Scripture: a powerful form of resistance to limited, inflexible accounts of
the ‘real’.
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I . INTRODUCTION
In the Fourth Gospel, expectations of the imminent apocalypse, and anticipa-
tion of a final resurrection, exist alongside assertions of eschatological trans-
formation enacted in the present. Polyphonous, multi-valent patterns of
thought foster ambiguity and tension where we long for resolution. Eugene
Vodolazkin’s Laurus meets the theological challenge posed by this eschato-
logical vision by reimagining the nature of time itself. Vodolazkin employs a
form of revelatory, constructive literary ‘distortion’, bending temporality to ac-
commodate the confounding qualities of Scripture.1 It is this distortion of time
that allows Laurus to do justice to the paradoxes of Johannine eschatology.
Vodolazkin, a contemporary Russian author and expert in medieval folklore,
has produced a novel dominated by eschatological concerns, which often dis-
rupts our sense of the temporal as a succession of distinct moments. Diachronic
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time is dissolved in a fantasy of cycles, seasons and prophecy which can accom-
modate both ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ eschatologies.2
Laurus presents a vivid picture of medieval Russia ‘trembling with religious
fervour’, portraying such faith without recourse to irony or cynicism.3 This,
coupled with the novel’s fluid portrayal of time, presents a powerful challenge
to any worldview which cannot accommodate the complexities of biblical
eschatology. In refusing to be governed by unilinear temporality, Vodolazkin’s
narrative not only performs a remythologising of time, but also allows this
transformed perspective to impinge on contemporary predilections and pre-
sumptions. He reveals how literary fiction can play a crucial role in drawing
out the ‘uniqueness and genius of the Fourth Gospel narrative’, showing how
‘chronological inconsistencies’ can be made ‘more accessible to a broader pub-
lic of Fourth Gospel audiences’ through the medium of a novel.4 So, as this art-
icle suggests, for any scholar of theology and literature interested in what
literary fiction can contribute to biblical studies, and to the public reception of
biblical texts, Laurus is worthy of close attention.
This article begins by briefly mapping out the difficulties inherent in the
study of New Testament eschatology, with a particular focus on the Gospel of
John. This survey will introduce a discussion of the range of attempts which
have been made to resolve or explain away such difficulties, with Rudolph
Bultmann’s existentialist eschatology providing the paradigmatic example of
this trend. In this context, Laurus can be presented as a radical alternative to the
Weltanschauung which dictates Bultmann’s treatment of Scripture. Vodolazkin
employs a series of strategies which capture a ‘very contemporary’ sense of the
‘malleability of time’.5 These strategies serve to deconstruct the idealist dismis-
sal of ‘mythical’ eschatology as an ‘inadequate’ fiction,6 whilst encouraging a
reaffirmation of the paradoxical interrelation of realised hope and future re-
demption. Furthermore, Vodolazkin illustrates how contemporary fiction can
play a vital role in challenging the ‘significant impact and long afterlife’ of
Bultmann’s hermeneutical approach to the Fourth Gospel,7 bringing to light
the ‘underpriced treasures of Johannine narrative prowess’ for both a lay and
specialist audience.8 The article culminates in a final discussion of the theo-
logical importance of literary distortion, as a tool which can threaten the tyr-
anny of the ‘possible’ in the service of the novelist and believer’s collaborative
attempt to ‘penetrate the surface of reality’.9
I I . ‘THE HOUR IS COMING, AND NOW IS’ : THE PROBLEM OF NEW
TESTAMENT ESCHATOLOGY
Whilst the scope of this article cannot accommodate a detailed examination of
the field, the purpose of this section is simply to show that the biblical account
of Christian eschatology is far from straightforward. The intermingling of
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Jewish apocalyptic expectations, belief in the imminence of the last days, and
intimations of a fully realised eschatology results in an overall picture defined
by ambiguity and tension. This enduring uncertainty is reflected in the scholar-
ly debates regarding this topic, and the diversity of interpretations it has gener-
ated.10 How, and when, the Christian promise would be fulfilled is a
conundrum ‘still to be wrestled with’.11
This quandary is partly a consequence of Jesus’ recorded proclamations con-
cerning the Kingdom of God. The Gospels contain several references to the
Kingdom as imminent or ‘at hand’ (Mark 1:15 etc.) and expected to arrive in
the near future (Mark 9:1).12 Jesus is placed here in the role of the messianic
figure destined to ‘usher in’ the new aeon which represented the fulfilment of
Jewish eschatological hope.13 Second Temple Judaism had developed the idea
of a qualitatively different ‘Age to Come’, finding references to the doctrine of
a future life in the Old Testament, and this seems to provide the content of
such declarations.14 However, this can be set against passages such as Luke
11:20, in which Jesus describes his performance of an exorcism as a sign that
‘the Kingdom of God has come’. The emphatically realised character of this
pronouncement seems to imply that Jesus believed the Kingdom had already
been manifested through the ‘crisis’ of his ministry.15 Indeed, David Brown
has argued that Luke’s overall intention is to extricate the Christian message
from an imminent eschatology by translating ‘future expectation’ into ‘present
reality’ (Luke 16:31 etc.).16 In this interpretation, the failure of the Parousia to
arrive is seen as having necessitated a re-working of the horizons of eschato-
logical expectation, even as the New Testament authors were still completing
their work. In contrast, E.P. Sanders has suggested we are deliberately exposed
to two different ‘senses’ of the Kingdom, one relating to ‘redemptive sover-
eignty’ in the present, and one to the ‘final vindication’ of Divine rule in the
future.17 Explanations like this highlight the inescapable tension built into
Jesus’ proclamation of the Kingdom, and also the perceived need to find some
means of resolving them.
These inherent dualities are particularly pronounced in the Gospel of John,
where realised and futuristic eschatologies are repeatedly juxtaposed. John
11:26 strongly implies the ‘possession of eternal life here and now’, as the logic-
al consequence of the ‘resurrection’ announced in the previous verse.18 This is
not an isolated occurrence, as the claim that whoever believes in the Son has
already gained eternal life is repeated in John 3:36 and elsewhere, reinforcing a
sense of the eschatological ‘Last Things’ as a present and permanent posses-
sion.19 However, John 5:28–29 provides a dramatic contrast to this by agreeing
closely with ‘the eschatology of popular Judaism’.20 Here we are told to look
toward an hour which is still ‘coming’, as the time of a general resurrection
and judgement which corresponds to certain elements of the Jewish apocalyp-
tic expectation. Again, this cannot be dismissed as a solitary exception. John
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3:5 can be read as purely future-orientated in its reference to spiritual rebirth as
a prerequisite for entry into the Kingdom, and verses such as 6:39–40 also ref-
erence a ‘last day’ which seems to be set firmly in the future.21 What we are
left with is two distinct lines of eschatological thought which ‘appear to be dia-
metrically opposed’, neither of which can be easily discounted or played
down.22
What is particularly notable in John is that there is no clear attempt to re-
solve this opposition. In fact, there are moments when the Evangelist appears
openly to embrace this as a creative tension, deliberately bringing together the
vertical (salvation realised timelessly through the human–Divine axis) and hori-
zontal (a more linear model of salvation concerned with the diachronic pro-
gression of time toward a final apocalypse) in a single phrase. The
announcement that ‘the hour is coming, and is now here’ (John 4:23) resolute-
ly refuses to offer the clarity of unidirectional eschatological movement, but ra-
ther employs the paradoxical as a mode of theological expression. John 5:25
restates this paradox, again transforming the dimensions of ordinary time and
representing the overall metaphysical trends of the Gospel by moving beyond
the literal, material world. The equivocacy identifiable in the Synoptic Gospels
is accepted and foregrounded, and we are left with a text in which ‘eschatology
is subsumed under Christology’.23 The advent of the Incarnate Logos is framed
by John as a demand for the radical redefinition of preconceived temporal
horizons.
I I I . JOHANNINE ESCHATOLOGY: RESOLVING THE PARADOX?
By focussing on the Gospel of John, we can observe how the instinctive reac-
tion to notionally illogical eschatologies has often been an attempt to explain
away such difficulties. When faced with John 4:23, scholars such as Jörg Frey
have felt bound by this ‘problem’ to ask whether such a phrase is ‘self-contra-
dictory’ and ‘meaningless’, or whether the tension can be ‘resolved towards ei-
ther of the two sides’.24 It is this search for resolution which has characterised
many of the responses, such as C.H. Dodd’s argument that in John the present
enjoyment of eternal life has become ‘the controlling and all-important con-
ception’. For Dodd, when John 6:54 sets the immediate possession of ‘eternal
life’ alongside a reference to the ‘last day’, the general resurrection has become
a ‘truth of less importance’.25 Frey’s own proffered solution reaches a similar
conclusion, suggesting that the future resurrection is included at moments such
as John 5:28 as a purely functional element intended to ‘allay the fears of a
community in distress’.26 Dodd and Frey find different routes toward the same
reduction of futurist dimensions to an insignificant ornament. Neither will
countenance the paradoxical retention of both strands in equal conversation,
and so the apocalyptic and horizontal is subordinated to the realised.
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The paradigmatic example of this apparent refusal to meet Johannine eschat-
ology on its own terms is Rudolf Bultmann’s treatment of ‘mythical eschat-
ology’ in the New Testament. Bultmann’s contentions hinge on the assertion
that any expectation of the ‘end of the world’ cannot be preserved, as we have
become ‘estranged’ from this.27 He deals with the dilemma of the delayed
Parousia by claiming that the notion of a future Kingdom or general resurrec-
tion is a ‘myth’ which talks about reality in an ‘inadequate way’.28 What drives
such an approach is Bultmann’s particular idea of the ‘modern man’, who must
be liberated from this ‘totally alien’ mythology. Through the ‘world view of
science’, and existentialist philosophy, this man has ‘opened up an understand-
ing for himself’ which cannot accommodate apocalyptic expectations.29
Bultmann believes futuristic eschatology has become ‘untenable’ because the
return of Christ is yet to occur. Therefore, as the diachronic passage of time is
seen to have disproved the horizontal dimension of scriptural eschatology, the
‘mythical event’ has become a matter for the present, not the future.30
The consequences of this are felt in Bultmann’s commentaries on John. He
sees any verses which might hint at the ‘old realistic eschatology’ as the work
of a secondary editor, rather than part of the organic unity of the whole.31 To
support this hypothesis, Bultmann postulates a redactor who ‘lacked logical
skill’, and added futuristic passages where they did not belong due to an insuffi-
ciently nuanced understanding of the Evangelist’s intentions.32 The problem
with this methodology is that there are a number of passages in John which
place fxg aŒ xio1, judgement or resurrection in the future, and are not ‘easily
detached or attributed to a redactor’.33 Bultmann’s commentary on John is re-
plete with insightful analysis, yet his approach to the eschatological often forces
him into conclusions difficult to support on literary grounds. Throughout the
Gospel, language of present fulfilment and jqiri1 emerges alongside the re-
frain of ‘not yet’, and there is very little—stylistically speaking—which can be
used to demarcate the elements he claims are the work of an editor.34
It seems these results may be the product of a hermeneutical fallacy. By start-
ing with predetermined criteria for determining what is ‘adequate’, Bultmann
ensures that we ‘find the textual element concealed’.35 He carries into his
interpretations Heidegger’s belief that a true understanding of time must focus
exclusively on the ‘now’, as speculation on future events represents an ‘uneigen-
tlich’ grasp of the temporal.36 Bultmann’s work on the New Testament
becomes a ‘locus classics’ of the idealist perspective which sees Christian eschato-
logical models as ‘fictive constructs’ devoid of any pretension ‘to depict a real-
ity independent of the human condition’.37 He sets up the Fourth Evangelist as
a ‘forerunner’ of these ‘modern interpretations’, and in doing so is bound to ig-
nore or redact any features of John which do not mirror his own theological
convictions.38 As Ruben Zimmermann observes: ‘Bultmann could only dem-
onstrate his “ideal” eschatological concept by postulating major intrusions into
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and adjustments to the transmitted text.’39 For Bultmann, the hermeneutical
process began with philosophical considerations which preceded the theolo-
gian’s engagement with the actual content of the Scriptures.40
Bultmann’s theology and philosophy were reacting against the modern pro-
gressivist understanding of time as ‘linear and homogenous’, which dominated
the 19th century, and constructed a model in which eschatology could only be
the future of a unidirectional temporal procession.41 Bultmann’s turn to existen-
tial transformation in the ‘now’ completely reversed this trend, replacing dia-
chronic succession with qualitative metamorphosis. Yet whilst recognising the
value of this move beyond the progressivist schema, Karl Rahner seems right to
ask whether allowing such a thorough existentialising of eschatological assertions
means that humans are themselves ‘mythologised’, as they are denied the ‘sober
fact’ of time.42 Bultmann’s move to the discontinuous moment still imagined
eschatology as a kind of zero-sum game in which the vertical and horizontal
were dissolved into a single event point, rather than held in productive tension.
Crucially, this emphasis on a singular ‘now’ is what led Bultmann to dismiss
any allusions to an ‘old realistic eschatology’ in John, choosing instead to attri-
bute these to a misguided redactor. There is plenty to admire in Bultmann’s
desire to imagine an eschatological event that cuts across linear time.
However, his application of Heideggerian existentialism to the Fourth Gospel
left no room for the possibility that the eschatological paradoxes in John were
the intentional work of a writer seeking to convey the impact of the incarnate
Logos. Indeed, Bultmann’s approach is typical of the instinct to reduce or re-
solve temporal paradoxes that still—as I have shown—shapes interpretations of
the Fourth Gospel. Prominent biblical scholars continue to treat verses such as
John 4:23 as a ‘headache’43 or ‘problem’44 requiring some form of solution. Far
from being anomalous, Bultmann’s decision to impose existentialist philosophy
onto the complexities of time in John appears to be representative of an urge
to bring something external into the scriptural text, rather than accept its more
challenging, strange forms of temporal expression. The ‘significant impact’ and
‘long afterlife’ of Bultmann’s methodological approach to interpreting the
Fourth Gospel continues to shape scholarship today, as exegetes persist in
attributing future and present eschatologies to redactional layers.45 Theology is
now tasked with challenging Bultmann’s own Weltanschauung by returning to
scriptural eschatology with open attentiveness, seeking imaginative models of
time which might allow us to preserve, respect and enjoy the paradoxical.
IV. LAURUS : TIME AND POSSIBIL ITY REIMAGINED
In the context of this task, the value of literary distortion to the theologian
becomes apparent. Laurus invites the reader to inhabit a world in which ideas
of time, expectation and possibility are determined by eschatology. Rather
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than setting linear progress against the irruption of eternity into the present,
Vodolazkin’s novel bends time into a shape that can allow these patterns to co-
exist. Laurus uses a plethora of strategies for establishing a fluid, flexible kind of
temporality that is naturally accommodating to the complexities of Christian
hope. In this conceptual landscape, scriptural paradox ceases to demand reso-
lution, and instead inspires the creation and testing of new models of reality.
By setting much of the action in a reimagining of medieval Russia,
Vodolazkin is able to revivify and make present for the reader ‘a world rich
with wonder and superstition’.46 The way in which this impacts upon the nov-
el’s treatment of time is exemplified by its measurement of duration using reli-
gious moments. The birth of Arseny, Laurus’ main protagonist, is given to us as
‘the 6,948th year since the Creation of the world’ and ‘the feast day of Arsenius
the Great’ (p. 9). Throughout the novel, dates and time periods are expressed
in relation to liturgical cycles and positions of faith, with the effect that the
very nature of temporality becomes bound to religious devotion. Vodolazkin’s
reader is drawn into a religious standpoint which instigates a refiguring of the
‘ordinary’, as we are asked to imagine life measured in ‘seasons and harvests’ ra-
ther than ‘clocks and clicks’.47 The transfiguration of temporality Vodolazkin
performs may have something vital to tell the contemporary reader about our
assumptions regarding time, faith, and reality.
A crucial example of this is Laurus’ capacity to hold together seemingly in-
compatible eschatological perspectives. In the novel’s opening chapter, it is
suggested to us that Arseny ‘possessed the elixir of immortality’ (p. 4). Arseny,
in his many guises, is repeatedly presented as the conduit for a dramatic realised
eschatology. Whilst dwelling next to a cemetery, he is told by a monastic elder
in confession that: ‘It is live people who lie there,’ as for God ‘all are living’ al-
ready (p. 30). This strongly implies the ‘possession of eternal life here and
now’—the Johannine pronouncement that those who believe have already
secured fxg aŒ xio1 (John 3:16).48 This conviction comes to dictate Arseny’s
own attitude toward death. When local villagers try to bury his deceased wife
and child, Arseny protests with anguish that ‘they do not understand . . . that
the dead can be resurrected [at any time]’ (p. 89).49 There is now little to separ-
ate or distinguish death from life, or the grave from resurrection to eternity.
Yet, in typically Johannine fashion, this transcending of time is balanced by a
vigorous belief in a future, apocalyptic ‘end of the world’ (p. 196). We are con-
stantly reminded that the dead are still awaiting ‘the universal resurrection’ (p.
296), and Arseny himself is taught to look for ‘the Saviour’s Judgement Day in
a future tyme [sic]’ (p. 46). No attempt is made to resolve these conflicting
positions, or to promote one above the other. Instead, the reader is simply told
that ‘attention to eschatology’ is ‘worthy of encouragement’ (p. 204).
Attentive consideration of the manifold complexities of eschatology is
endorsed in place of the urge to rationalise or explain.
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This exhortation to pay proper attention to eschatology is complemented
by the dismantling of preconceived notions of time which might hinder this
task. A key tool in this constructive deconstruction is Laurus’ use of prophetic
visions. As a child, Arseny sees a ‘reflection of himself’ as an elderly man in the
stove fire, a vision which prompts the narratival present tense to slide into that
of the venerable Arseny in his final years, alerting the reader to an uprooting of
the concrete ‘now’ (p. 26). We are later introduced to the character
Ambrogio, whose life is also punctuated by vivid, accurate glimpses of the fu-
ture which continue to facilitate this fluidity of narrative, tense and setting.
Ambrogio’s foresight leads him to conclude that ‘there is no time’, and our
consciousness of diachronic succession is ‘given to us by the grace of God so
we will not get mixed up’ (p. 228).50 For Vodolazkin’s prophet time is no lon-
ger an inescapable brute fact, but a Divine concession to our human limita-
tions. And as Ambrogio realises, when we entertain this possibility ‘the very
existence of time is open to question’, as its ‘necessity’ is seen as a product of
our cognitive weakness (p. 229).
As the prophetic mode dissolves the constraints of rigid temporality, the
moment of Ambrogio’s death captures the scope of what this perspective per-
mits the author to attempt. When Ambrogio dies, he is granted a sibylline vi-
sion of an ‘Mi-8 helicopter’ lowering the gilded statue of an angel onto a
cathedral in modern-day Saint Petersburg. However, this is not simply a leap
into the future, as this vision then becomes contemporaneous with
Ambrogio’s demise. From the helicopter, an ‘absolutely real angel’ can be seen
raising Ambrogio’s soul to heaven in ‘distant Palestine’ (pp. 286–7). A radical
simultaneity is introduced which completely transcends the boundaries of
time, reminding us that the author is free to step outside of the ‘concrete possi-
bilities of his [or her] culture’.51
This esoteric treatment of time and eschatology is embodied in the novel’s
presentation of Arseny as a holy fool: the Russian Orthodox figure who ‘testi-
fies to the reality of the anti-world’, performing the role of a ‘prophetic Spirit-
bearer’ who proclaims ‘the possibility of the impossible’.52 Arseny fits this
mould, as a prophetic figure who ‘did not always understand what time ought
to be considered the present’ (p. 5). He is marked out as a character who mani-
fests ‘obvious grace from God’ (p. 117), and thus becomes a focal point
through which Vodolazkin can mediate his challenge to the ‘possible’. The
holy fool encapsulates ‘a condition that embraces paradox’, a form of madness
which counterintuitively expresses ‘a special line in the truth’.53 Vodolazkin’s
desire to draw attention to this irony emerges in another fool’s response to
Arseny: ‘I see you are the realest of holy fools. Real’ (p. 145). The disorientated
reader, now starved of the comfort of diachronic time, is told to look to the
fool for the ‘Real’.
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Vodolazkin uses his holy fool to translate this disruption of time into an im-
perative which acts upon the reader. Access to Arseny’s transformative powers
and foresight is presented to a cynical highwayman as contingent on ‘metanoia’
(p. 248), and throughout the novel it is dependent on a certain quality of faith.
Kallistos Ware describes the fool for Christ as one who ‘carries the act of meta-
noia or “change of mind” to its farthest extent’.54 Therefore, the privileged ac-
cess to the ‘Real’ Arseny represents is only obtained through a surrendering of
previously held preconceptions about the nature of reality. To acknowledge
our need for repentance is to accept a ‘change in thoughts’ (p. 248), and the
change Laurus prescribes is a concession to the malleability of time. Vodolazkin
is using the superficially irreal to remind us that ‘the Imagination is what
Providence uses to get men into reality, into existence’.55 The author and holy
fool co-affirm the paradox that when we distort the world, we may in fact
‘change it into itself’.56
In Laurus, repentance is portrayed as a reappraisal of the boundaries of possi-
bility, and this form of metanoia paves the way for the exploration of new mod-
els of time better suited to accommodating eschatological complexities. For
Bultmann, ‘mythical eschatology’ was rendered ‘inadequate’ by the passage of
time,57 yet in Vodolazkin’s novel it is time itself which proves deficient.
Whilst lying on the verge of death, Arseny experiences a moment when occur-
rences start ‘shamelessly muddling prescribed sequences’ so that ‘time could
not cope with them’, as ‘[I]t refused to govern these sorts of events’ (p. 167).
This anthropomorphising of time as petulant and pedantic is an important part
of Laurus’ satirisation of conventional temporality. When, towards the end of
his journeys, Arseny begins to sense his life is ‘going backwards’, he observes
that: ‘Time was coming apart at the seams, like a wayfarer’s travelling bag.’
Time’s repeated failure to absorb the momentous events which shape Arseny’s
existence exposes the need for a radical reimagining of the temporal (p. 295).
Reflecting on Time’s deficiencies, Richard Bauckham links Bultmann’s
eschatological vision to Moltmann’s ‘discontinuous moment’, suggesting both
theologians envisage a ‘depth’ that ‘cannot be reduced to the horizontal linear
movement of time’.58 What is ingenious about Laurus is that it acknowledges
this incompatibility, but rather than resolving it by taking eschatology out of
time, it uses distortion to try to bend time into a more accommodating shape.
This distortion of time creates a fictive world through which the reader can
be introduced to an expanded, reconceptualised temporal realm. Vodolazkin
offers a series of metaphors which imagine time in the language of circularity,
culminating in Arseny’s description of monastic life as a setting in which:
‘Time no longer moves forward but goes around in circles.’ His new vision
represents the productive consequences of allowing time to be shaped by faith
and worship. The daily and weekly worship cycles, as well as the ‘largest’ an-
nual cycle determined by the ‘great feasts and saints’ days’, generate a kind of
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annular temporal motion (pp. 307–8). What is notable here is that Arseny’s
proffered image is immediately revised by a monastic elder, who suggests the
alternative picture of a ‘spiral’ as a more ‘open figure’ which implies progress as
well as repetition (p. 308). Vodolazkin’s narrative thus produces a dramatisa-
tion of the creation of religious metaphors. These can be ‘reality depicting’ be-
cause they give access to the fundamental ‘states and relations’ of the world, yet
they must also always be open to revision, and aware of their own limita-
tions.59 When literary distortion takes on a visionary quality this is not theo-
logically valuable because it offers certainty, but rather because it can create
uncertainty, and then suggest imaginative alternatives.60
The final step in Vodolazkin’s reimagining of time is the transformation of
the novel itself into a spiral. As the elderly Arseny, ‘covered with wrinkles’,
completes his final years, he sees in the stove fire the young Arseny who
watched him as a boy. At this point, the same words used in the opening of the
work are exactly repeated, with the difference being that we have approached
them from the perspective of the old man, not the ‘light-haired boy’ (p. 311).
The structural form of the novel reinforces its content by immersing us in
repetition with a difference: an ‘open’ circle which can accommodate both re-
capitulation and progress.
Through this prophetic episode, the spiral shape of Laurus’ theological
movements is completed. What is captured here is the ‘vertical’ and the ‘hori-
zontal’ together. The discontinuous, eternal moment which transcends time is
made visible from two different perspectives on the linear temporal plane.
Vodolazkin began by placing eschatological paradoxes in direct relation to
time, concluding that this necessitated the deconstruction of temporality.
Having performed this dismantling as a call for a ‘change in thought’, he then
returns to the structures of time with creative intent. Yet this return is not sim-
ply a repetition, as it yields a constructive distortion which permits and encour-
ages the interrelation of realised and futuristic eschatological models.
V. F ICTION, DISTORTION, AND TRUTH
Literary distortion can help the theologian to cultivate a form of dialogical rela-
tionship with scriptural testimony which avoids obscuring the truths it might
reveal. By encouraging us to imaginatively inhabit worlds in which certain
constraints have been stripped away, constructive distortions can inculcate in
the reader a broadened sense of the possible, leading to a deeper appreciation
of ‘the importance of diversity, complexity and competing narratives in the
Scriptures’.61
The theological significance of this imaginative expansion can be further
elucidated using the biblical concept of truth as aletheia, borrowed from
Hellenistic philosophy. As Guy Collins notes, this kind of truth is not
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comprehended in the sphere of empirical evidence, but instead is generated
through the ‘friction’ produced when a story causes us to doubt the ‘oversim-
plifying accounts of reality’ that ‘masquerade as human understanding’.62
Whilst this should not be used to argue for a separation of biblical and empiric-
al truths, it does suggest a specific form of theological truth which literary dis-
tortion might claim to access. When Ambrogio hypothesises about the
apocalypse, what is important is not the precise calculations he offers, but the
fact that the ‘principal source’ of his conclusions is a careful reading of ‘Holy
Scripture’ (p. 220). What truth this betokens is manifested in his loyalty to the
imminent eschatology he finds in Scripture. As in the Johannine sense of ale-
theia, this is truth concerned not with the ‘narrowly factual’, but with our rela-
tionship to God ‘as the ultimate source of all reality’.63 From this perspective,
time is not a concrete reality but a ‘curse’, which we are ‘locked up in’ because
of our ‘weakness’ (pp. 228–9). Vodolazkin’s novel suggests that a deeper reality
becomes attainable when we allow Scripture to act upon our sense of tempor-
ality and challenge its resistance to polyphonic eschatologies. Ambrogio
believes that the future, and even the eschaton, ‘already exists’ in some sense,
yet still retains a passionate interest in biblical accounts of diachronic progress
toward the ‘end of the world’ (p. 228). In the open, dialogic model which
Laurus proposes ‘we interpret texts’ and ‘texts interpret us’.64
By alerting us to possibilities which transcend more anodyne, rigid accounts
of the world, distortion can undermine the foundations of these oversimplified
pictures of reality. Laurus captures a strikingly modern sense of the ‘confusing
and impenetrable’ post-Einsteinian world, in which we are ‘living in the
shadow of the theory of relativity’.65 Ambrogio’s story does not end in medi-
eval Russia, as we are told that his theory of time was eventually turned into a
‘wildly successful’ book which ‘developed Einstein’s theory of the relativity of
time’ (p. 324). Vodolazkin is not merely introducing the reader to an alterna-
tive description of time shaped by ambiguity and uncertainty, but he is using
this to highlight the fragile status of our own default understanding of how
time works. Contemporary science is increasingly bound to unverifiable mod-
els which claim ontological access to the world’s structures,66 making it diffi-
cult to dismiss Laurus’ exploration of the ‘spiral’ of time as an unscientific flight
of fancy. Indeed, Arseny and Ambrogio’s instinctive aversion to ‘time’s unidi-
mensionality’ is redolent of David Wilkinson’s proposal that the science of
multi-dimensionality is a potential path toward better understanding the rela-
tion of eternity to the temporal world (p. 186).67 Vodolazkin’s novel betrays an
awareness that ‘the artist’s work is inescapably a claim about reality’.68 He does
not afford the reader the comfort of confining his distortions to the realm of
the irreal, but rather uses them to probe the fragile foundations of scientific fac-
ticity. By straying into the realm of science-fiction, Vodolazkin dredges up our
‘human awareness’ of the world as ‘arbitrary and contingent’; his forays into
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this genre offer liberation from the ‘groove’ of real life in which our experience
and instincts can ‘confine’ us.69 Once Laurus’ work is done, the dichotomy be-
tween science and mythology which underpins Bultmann’s Weltanschauung
seems less secure.
Vodolazkin’s refusal to operate within certain assumed boundaries could
help biblical scholars to overcome externally imposed restrictions. It was
Bultmann’s desire to lump together the historical and mythological and move
on from both. Yet in Laurus, this neat distinction between past and present no
longer holds. Vodolazkin’s language is an astonishing blend of archaic words,
biblical quotes, medieval texts, and modern slang.70 Throughout the novel,
the reader is confronted with ‘one-word bursts of odd spellings’ or sentences in
which archaic vocabulary sits alongside contemporary idioms and slang.71
Rather than residing in one time period, the language of the narrative voice
slips seamlessly between different linguistic ‘strata’, undermining our expecta-
tions.72 Describing the fate of the ‘plague dead’, the narrative voice suddenly
switches to appropriately archaic language, referring to those ‘kylled by kyllers,
and stricken by fyre [sic]’ (‘ubiitsy ubiisha, i ogn’ popali’ in the original) (p. 86).
Yet when outlining the life and career of the 20th-century woman Francesca
Flecchi, the narrative voice adopts the colloquialisms and casual, idiomatic lan-
guage of modernity to reflect the historical period described, exhibiting a tem-
poral fluidity mirroring the novel’s subject matter (pp. 323–4). Even more
unsettling is the tendency for different characters to employ a wide variety of
linguistic styles, seemingly unrelated to the historical moment they inhabit.
For instance, a bandit Laurus encounters in medieval Russia speaks in the slang
of the 21st century: ‘Akh ty, ë-moë . . . Ia zhe, blia, . . .’ (‘Oh jeez, you . . . Son of
a Bitch’) (p. 128). Similarly, the Holy Fool, Foma, lives in 15th century Pskov,
yet uses the insults of a modern teenager: ‘shithead’, ‘prick’ etc. (pp. 145–6).
Foma is both a yurodivy—the historical figure of the Holy Fool, rooted in
Russian Orthodox tradition—and an individual apparently free from any tem-
poral constraints in the words he uses. Neither the narrator nor characters in
Laurus seem to be tied to a particular time regarding their use of language, such
that the text itself evokes an unstable, open temporality.
Janet Fitch describes these ‘anachronisms’ as moments which ‘speak to our
dilemma as modern inhabitants of a world made in—and of—the past’.73
There is much to commend in this argument, yet it can be taken further.
Vodolazkin is deliberately creating a world in which the anachronism has
ceased to exist. When ‘yellowed plastic bottles’ suddenly emerge from under
the melting medieval snow, the tension this incongruity generates is a sign that
we can longer delineate between past and present: the decaying splendour of
modernity is being gradually exposed through a dialogue with the cyclical and
the seasonal (p. 66). David Brown suggests that attempts to make saintly figures
‘creatures of our own day’ are often spoilt by ‘conspicuous historical
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howlers’.74 Here, Vodolazkin’s intentionally pronounced ‘howlers’ are a sign
that his holy fools cannot be confined to the past, and their mythological mus-
ings should not be disregarded as ‘historical’.
Laurus reveals that fictional distortion might itself claim to have an eschato-
logical dimension, in that it ‘challenges the finality of appearance here and
now’.75 Vodolazkin brings together the medieval mind and its ‘extraordinary
capacity to think laterally as well as imaginatively’, with our own age which is
‘often more wooden’ in comparison.76 Because of its heady blend of linguistic
styles, Laurus can dramatise this meeting within its own exchanges. When an-
other holy fool, Foma, admonishes sceptical onlookers for their response to
Arseny—‘And you, you sons of bitches, think he’s talking to walls’—it is hard
to escape the feeling he is speaking to us (p. 149). Indeed, when Foma later
tries to explain the ‘paradox’ of the holy fool’s passive acceptance of suffering,
his narrow-minded audience object in the voice of the 21st century: ‘you’re
not, like, you know, allowed to beat holy fools’ (p. 158). Laurus sets itself up in
opposition to the ‘Reason’ which is allergic to paradox, and its use of distortion
allows it to confront this threat to biblical faith in the past, present, and future.
VI . CONCLUSION
Attesting to the revelatory potential of distortion in this context ought not to
necessitate a dismissal of alternative theological approaches to time and eschat-
ology. In fact, part of what Laurus provides is a warning against exclusivism.
Bultmann’s project of demythologising was an important contribution to the
study of scriptural eschatology as it challenged the dominant narrative by help-
ing to puncture the tyrannical optimism of progressivist eschatologies.
Vodolazkin’s work can be taken as an attempt to find increasingly innovative
ways of reminding his readership that any ‘attention to eschatology, even on its
own, seems worthy of encouragement’ (p. 204). And in forming his own
unique response to Scripture, Bultmann also helped to reawaken this attention.
The model Vodolazkin suggests is one of oscillation, rather than stasis. To ex-
press the unsettling complexities of Johannine eschatology involves creating a
perpetual blur of circles, spirals, and straight lines which lurches from demy-
thologising to remythologising. As Martin Buber eloquently argues, to rest in a
‘reliable world’ of ‘density and duration’ is to embrace ‘nothingness’.77 Or, as
an elder standing by the ‘Empty Tomb’ tells Arseny: ‘Knowledge is repose and
faith is motion’ (p. 297); we should not rest in epistemological comfort when
faced with the duplexities and contradictions which shape the biblical account
of eschatology.
To define a work of literature as a distortion of reality the reader must be able to
state with certainty what is ‘real’, and it is in this problem of definition that the
theological value of Vodolazkin’s work is found. If we read Laurus and return to
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our own beliefs troubled by this difficulty, and less sure of the boundaries between
authentic and illusory, then it seems something important has taken place. As
Slavoj Zizek argues, ‘as soon as we renounce fiction and illusion, we lose reality it-
self’.78 To allow the biblical texts to ‘read us real’ we must see our own sense of
reality as constructed, and therefore as malleable and fluid. Vodolazkin’s work
broadens reason out to include a ‘rationality of narrative’: a sense of truth which
can encompass the persuasive power and imaginative depth of Scripture.79 The
theological truth Arseny proposes is that ‘time is not all-powerful’ (p. 270), as the
perceived passage of horizontal time is not sufficient warrant to denounce all
‘mythical eschatology’ as ‘untenable’.80 As biblical scholarship seeks to do justice to
the singular ‘genius’ of the Johannine narrative,81 resisting the allure of Bultmann’s
hermeneutical approach, Vodolazkin has provided an example of how fiction can
contribute to this project. For scholars striving to understand the rich complexities
of the Fourth Gospel narrative, or for a lay audience exploring the treasures of this
unique text, Vodolazkin offers literary fiction as a source of insight and inspiration.
Perhaps what Vodolazkin achieves is a reinvigorating of the spirit of theo-
logical enquiry which imagines truth-seeking in the apostrophic mode. His
fiction is not claiming privileged access to the truth, but rather seeks to liberate
us from the realm of concrete assertions. He is not asserting that time truly is a
‘circle’ or ‘spiral’, any more than he is suggesting that decaying plastic bottles
really could be found in medieval Russia. But that is not the point.
Theologically speaking, each new imaginative vision of temporality Laurus
presents can be interpreted as a gesture toward that which resides beyond the
world as we see it now.
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